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Abstract in English 
The paper focuses on the relationship between competition and quality in the Dutch hospital 
sector. We analyse the period of 2004-2008, in which a healthcare reform took place in the 
Netherlands, introducing competition in the healthcare sector. The increased attention to 
hospital quality and its growing importance in a new institutional environment have resulted in 
a gradual increase of the voluntary disclosure of quality indicators by Dutch hospitals. We use 
panel data on Dutch general and academic hospitals in 2004-2008, including both process 
indicators (e.g., share of operation cancellations on short notice and share of diagnoses within 5 
days) and outcome indicators (e.g., mortality rates) of hospital quality. We take the correlation 
between the disclosure decision and the level of the disclosed quality indicators explicitly into 
account by estimating a bivariate model. We find that competition explains differences in 
performance on process indicators, but not on outcome indicators.  
  Key words: competition in healthcare, quality, voluntary disclosure 
JEL code: I1, L8, H4 
 
Abstract in Dutch 
In deze studie analyseren wij de relatie tussen concurrentie en de kwaliteit van de geleverde 
zorg door ziekenhuizen in Nederland. We analyseren de periode 2004-2008, waarin een 
belangrijke hervorming van de gezondheidszorg heeft plaatsgevonden in Nederland, namelijk 
de liberalisering van tarieven in de zorgsector. Als gevolg hiervan is de aandacht voor kwaliteit 
en transparantie van de zorg toegenomen. Wij maken gebruik van gegevens van de Inspectie 
voor de Gezondheidszorg voor de periode 2004-2008. Dit betreft alle Nederlandse algemene en 
academische ziekenhuizen en biedt inzicht in zowel hun proceskwaliteit (o.a. het percentage 
van afgezegde operaties op korte termijn en het percentage van diagnoses op borstkanker die 
binnen 5 dagen zijn uitgevoerd) als uitkomstkwaliteit (o.a. mortaliteit). Wij schatten een 
bivariaat model dat rekening houdt met de correlatie tussen het niveau van de 
kwaliteitsindicatoren en de beslissingen van ziekenhuizen om deze informatie openbaar te 
maken. Wij vinden dat concurrentie effect heeft gehad op een aantal procesindicatoren, maar 
niet op de uitkomstindicatoren.   
 
Steekwoorden: marktwerking in de zorgsector, kwaliteit, het openbaar maken van kwaliteit   4   5 
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Summary
1 
In the last decade, the role of competition in the hospital sector has increased in many countries. 
While there is a consensus in economic literature that competition can save costs of hospital 
care, the relationship between competition and hospital quality is less clear-cut. According to 
the literature, the effect of competition on quality can depend on certain institutional features, 
such as price regulation or specific policies with respect to quality standards and reporting. 
Therefore, case studies that focus on particular countries and particular quality dimensions may 
contribute to a deeper understanding of incentives provided by different institutional settings 
and their respective effects on quality of hospital care.  
 
This paper focuses on the relationship between competition and quality of hospital care in the 
Netherlands. We analyse the period of 2004-2008, in which a major healthcare reform took 
place, introducing competition between health insurers and partly liberalising hospital prices. 
Our analysis uses the ‘Basis Data Set’ of quality indicators collected by the Dutch Health Care 
Inspectorate (the IGZ) in the period 2004-2008. The dataset includes both process and outcome 
indicators. Process indicators (e.g., operation cancellations on short notice, timely diagnostics, 
or regularity of patient checkups) focus on hospital processes, whereas outcome indicators (e.g., 
unplanned reoperations and mortality rates) characterize patient outcomes. The inclusion of 
process indicators is an important contribution of this paper, since the economic literature so far 
has mainly focused on outcome indicators.  
 
Not all hospitals revealed their quality indicators in the first years of the survey, which may be 
due to self-selection of (higher) quality outcomes. We therefore estimate a bivariate model that 
allows for correlation between quality outcomes and disclosure decisions. The hospital 
disclosure decision is modelled as a duration process.   
 
We find significant but small effects of competition on process indicators and no effect on 
outcome indicators. In particular, we find that hospitals in more competitive areas have more 
operation cancellations on short notice (within 24 hours before the planned operation) and have 
a larger share of hip fracture injuries of 65+ patients that were operated not within one day. 
Both results may be due to the greater utilisation of operation capacity in hospitals located in 
more competitive areas, since these hospitals have stronger incentive to increase their 
production and cost efficiency. At the same time, we find that hospitals that face more 
competition perform more frequent check-ups for diabetic patients and have a faster diagnostic 
 
1 The authors are grateful to Pieter van Bemmel, Paul de Bijl, Rudy Douven, Jeroen Geelhoed, Rein Halbersma, Xander 
Koolman, Misja Mikkers, Kees Molenaar, Ellen Magenheim, Esther Mot, Erik Schut, and Andriaan Soetevent for their 
comments and suggestions on earlier versions, and to the participants of the Amsterdam Center of Law and Economics 
(ACLE, Amsterdam University) conference ‘Innovation, information and competition’ and the 3rd Biennial Conference of the 
American Society of Health Economists (ASHE) ’Health, Healthcare and Behavior’ for discussion.   8 
on mamma cancer. Thus, they perform better on quality aspects that may allow them to attract 
more patients. We check the robustness of our results by estimating the model using seven 
different indicators of competition: the number of competing hospitals in the catchment area of 
10, 15 and 20 km around the hospital, the number of competitors adjusted for the population in 
the respective catchment area, and the distance to the closest competitor. We find the qualitative 
results for these different measures to be consistent with each other, securing the robustness of 
our conclusions. 
 
In addition to small differences in process indicators attributed to the effect of competition, we 
also find that the average performance on most process and outcome indicators have improved 
over time, suggesting that more policy attention to hospital quality was possibly beneficial for 
the average quality level of Dutch hospitals. 
 
All in all, the main contribution of this paper lies in extending the scope of empirical analysis to 
incorporate process quality. We conclude that competition between Dutch hospitals has so far 
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1  Introduction 
In recent years, government expenses on healthcare in OECD countries have risen rapidly, with 
increases between 5% and 10% in real terms per annum.
2 To reduce costs, many countries have 
chosen to introduce elements of competition in healthcare markets. The idea is that competition 
increases efficiency by rewarding efficient health care providers or insurers, with efficiency 
being measured for a given level of quality. While the positive effect of competition on the 
efficiency of hospital care has been recognised in the economic literature, theoretical 
predictions about the relationship between competition and quality are ambiguous. Increased 
competition can either lower or raise quality, depending on price regulation, the preferences of 
marginal consumers and the level of transparency in the market (Gaynor, 2006).  
 
This paper uses a data set of quality indicators of Dutch hospitals, the so-called Basis Data Set, 
to empirically assess the relation between competition and quality of hospital care. As in Blom 
et al. (2009) and Propper et al. (2004), we use the number of competitors within the hospital 
catchment area (adjusted for the population density) as a proxy for competition. This captures 
the idea that patient flows are more easily diverted from a hospital to hospitals nearby than to 
hospitals farther away. Thus, a larger number of competitors in the hospital catchment area 
correspond to a larger threat of losing patients. Of course, different mechanisms may trigger 
changes in patient flows. For example, patients may prefer one hospital to another because it 
delivers better quality, but also health insurers or general practitioners can direct patient flows 
away from a particular hospital. Both these mechanisms may play role in the Netherlands. Our 
measure of competition abstracts from the particular underlying mechanism that drives 
competition.  
 
The Basis Data Set used in this paper was developed in the course of the gradual liberalisation 
process in the Dutch hospital sector. Since January 2005, healthcare insurers and healthcare 
providers have to negotiate prices for an increasing subset of healthcare services. Since 2006, 
all consumers are also free to choose any health insurer they want. In conjunction with these 
changes, a set of diagnosis-treatment combinations was introduced, which formed the basis of a 
new budgetary system for hospitals.
3 The gradual liberalization was accompanied by an 
initiative to improve transparency of the quality of care in hospitals. In 2004, the Dutch Health 
Care Inspectorate (IGZ) started to collect and publish data on a standardized set of quality 
indicators, thus creating the Basis Data Set. Initially, hospitals could still provide data on a 
 
2 Source: OECD Health Data 2009 - Frequently Requested Data. 
3 Hospitals used to be financed on a lump-sum basis. The lump-sum budgets were in effect until 2001, after which the 
budgets became flexible and scaled with the number of inpatient admissions, outpatient admissions, and in-patient days of 
stay. For diagnosis-treatment combinations that fall in the liberalized segment, hospitals and insurers have to negotiate 
prices. As from January 1, 2005, the prices of about 10% of services fell in the liberalized segment. In 2007, this was 
extended to 20%, and in 2009 to 34%. Source: NZa (2004) and NZa (2009).   10 
voluntary basis.
4 As from 2009, a new and mandatory set of indicators, comprising both 
medical quality indicators as well as subjective quality indicators, such as consumer 
satisfaction, has replaced the Basis Data Set. The Basis Data Set covers in total 20 categories of 
quality indicators on Dutch hospitals over the period 2004-2008. It includes a wide variety of 
quality indicators, enabling us to differentiate across different categories of hospital quality 
(outcome, process and structure indicators). This gives us a rich opportunity for empirical 
analysis of the interrelationship between competition and quality of healthcare provision in the 
Dutch hospital sector.   
 
Our main contribution to the existing empirical literature is to include also process indicators of 
quality, such as the average frequency of tests for chronic patients and the rate of cancelled 
operations on short notice. Most econometric papers focus on mortality rates as a measure of 
quality and sometimes on other outcome indicators, such as unplanned reoperation rates. 
Extending the scope of the analysis to process indicators, which are less distorted by exogenous 
factors than outcome indicators, allows us to test the hypothesis that the incentives created by 
competition have a stronger effect on process indicators than on outcome indicators (Baker, 
2000). Since the level of a quality indicator and the hospital’s decision to publicly disclose this 
information may depend on each other, our empirical approach needs to take into account the 
possible correlation between these processes. Therefore, we estimate a bivariate model that 
describes both hospital disclosure decisions on individual quality indicators and the level of the 
disclosed quality indicators.   
 
We find significant effects of competition on indicators that measure process quality and not on 
indicators that measure outcome quality. More specifically, our empirical results indicate that 
the presence of more competitors in the hospital catchment area improves the timeliness of 
diagnostics, but increases short-notice cancellations and delays of operations for some patients. 
In addition to the effects of competition between hospitals on process indicators, we find that 
several indicators (outcome indicators as well as process indicators) improved over time. This 
suggests the possibility of a generic positive effect of policy changes for these indicators.  
 
This paper proceeds by providing a short review of the related theoretical and empirical 
literature in section 2. Section 3 discusses our data in more depth. Section 4 describes the 
econometric model. Section 5 presents our empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
 
4 When a new Health Law was passed in July 2006, the provision of quality information to consumers became mandatory, 
however, hospitals were allowed to opt out of the Basis Set data collection if they provided quality information via an 
alternative publishing outlet.   11 
2  Related literature 
The theoretical and empirical literature does not give unambiguous results on whether more 
competition increases or decreases quality, whether more competition encourages or 
discourages voluntary disclosure of quality information, and how disclosure interrelates with 
quality.
5 This section reviews the major conclusions from the literature on these issues. 
Effect of competition on hospital quality 
According to the theoretical literature, competition increases hospital quality when prices are 
regulated, but may have either positive or negative effects on quality under unregulated prices 
(see Gaynor (2006) for a review of this literature). Essentially, if firms cannot compete in prices 
and a larger market share increases profit, they will compete in quality to attract consumers 
instead. When firms can choose both prices and quality, however, the downward pressure of 
competition on prices may put downward pressure on quality as well. Equilibrium quality 
choices thus depend on the elasticities of demand with respect to price and quality. If the quality 
elasticity of demand is low, while the price elasticity is high, quality will decrease as 
competition increases (Dranove and Satterthwaite, 2000). 
A scarce but growing empirical literature also gives ambiguous results on the relation between 
competition and hospital quality. Most studies apply a structure-conduct-performance 
specification, in which performance indicators (quality indices) are regressed on indicators of 
competition and some control variables. Competition is often measured by the number of 
competitors in the hospital neighbourhood
6 or by concentration indices such as the Herfindahl-
Hirschmann Index.
7 To measure quality, most studies use risk-adjusted mortality indicators 
(e.g. Volpp et al., 2003, Propper et al., 2004, and more recently Gaynor et al., 2010) or other 
outcome indicators such as unplanned reoperations and in-hospital infections (e.g., Sari, 2002, 
and Espinosa and Bernard, 2005), but rarely process indicators, a notable exception being 
Bloom et al. (2009) that stresses the link between hospital management quality and clinical 
outcome quality.  
 
As more comprehensive datasets on quality become available, the next step is to collect the 
evidence on the effect of competition on this broader range of indicators in order to achieve a 
deeper understanding of the relationship between competition and quality. As shown by Baker 
(2000), the strength of incentives used in an organisation depends to a large degree on the 
characteristics of the performance measures available. In particular, stronger incentives can be 
set for tasks where the relationship between the effort and the performance is less distorted by 
 
5 Bijlsma and Pomp (2008) review the existing economic literature on the effect of transparency on quality. 
6 The number of competitors is typically adjusted for population density.  
7 The Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) is the sum of the squares of all firms’ market shares.   12 
exogenous factors. Since hospitals are likely to have more controls over processes than about 
outcomes (depending also on the health of patients), the effects of incentives on hospital 
process indicators are likely to be more pronounced than on outcome indicators.  
 
The role of disclosure 
Economic theory predicts that as long as quality disclosure is costless, a firm will voluntarily 
disclose its quality level when it can credibly do so (Viscusi, 1978; Grossman, 1981; and 
Milgrom, 1981). This result obtains since absent disclosure, consumers would be willing to pay 
the price that corresponds to the average expected quality. A firm offering a product with a 
higher-than-average quality will, therefore, always disclose it in order to obtain a higher-than-
average price. If the firm does not disclose quality, consumers will adjust the expected average 
price downwards. 
 
A firm’s choice of quality effort and its decision to reveal information on quality may be 
interrelated for several reasons (Dranove and Jin, 2009). Both choices can be affected by 
competition, but also by other factors, such as the cost of disclosure, the possibility of strategic 
differentiation, or the type of regulation. 
Grossman and Hart (1980) and Jovanovich (1982) show that when disclosure entails private 
costs, only firms with quality levels above a certain threshold will find it beneficial to disclose 
their quality. Indeed, some recent empirical studies find that quality positively correlates with 
the willingness to participate in voluntary disclosure initiatives (McCornick et al., 2002, 
Agarwal et al., 2009). In contrast, Gavazza and Lizzeri (2007) provide arguments why high-
quality firms may be not willing to disclose their quality. The latter result arises under binding 
capacity constraints and/or price regulation, in which case high-quality firms do not benefit 
from the increased consumer demand for their services in response to disclosure.
8 Since the 
hospital sector features both capacity constraints and regulation, the possibility of a negative 
relation between hospital quality and its voluntary disclosure cannot be dismissed. 
 
Oligopolistic competition introduces additional mechanisms that can affect firms’ disclosure 
decisions. Two recent theoretical papers on this subject show that under imperfect competition 
firms may use (non)disclosure to strategically differentiate their goods in order to soften price 
competition. Both papers predict less disclosure in an oligopoly setting. In particular, Board 
(2009), argues that non-disclosure may be a device for firms to reduce competition. In 
particular, two high-quality firms can vertically differentiate their products if one of them does 
not disclose. Levin et al. (2009) consider costly quality disclosure with horizontally 
 
8 Indeed, consumers do respond to higher hospital quality. Pope (2009) studies the effect of media rankings of US hospitals. 
He finds that hospitals that improve their ranking are able to attract significantly more patients.   13 
differentiated products under duopoly and a cartel. Since one firm’s disclosure creates a positive 
externality for another firm, expected disclosure is higher when firms coordinate. Hence, both 
papers predict that strategic competition makes voluntary quality disclosure less likely. These 
theoretical results corroborate the empirical findings by Jin (2005), who analyses the voluntary 
disclosure of American HMOs via the National Committee of Quality Assurance reviews in the 
period 1991-1998. After controlling for cost and demand shifters, Jin finds that highly 
competitive markets feature early disclosers but have lower average disclosure rates. She argues 
that HMOs use voluntary disclosure as an instrument to differentiate themselves from 
competitors.   
Overall, the literature gives ambiguous answers about the relationships between competition 
and quality, and between quality and its disclosure. Yet, it provides some guidance about the 
factors underlying these relationships that have to be taken into account in empirical analysis. In 
particular, the literature stresses that the decisions on quality and its disclosure are not fully 
independent of each other, which prompts for a careful addressing of selection effects in 
datasets on quality. It also shows that the level of competition can affect both the disclosure and 
quality effort decisions of hospitals. So far, the empirical literature on the effect of competition 
on hospital quality mostly focuses on outcome indicators. Therefore, bringing in process 
indicators may add new insight into the relationship between competition and quality. Based on 
Baker (2000), the effect of the difference in incentives may appear to be more pronounced in 
process indicators, rather than in outcome indicators.    15 
3  Data 
In this section, we describe the dataset used in our empirical analysis. We start with quality 
indicators (section 3.1), after which we turn to indicators of competition (section 3.2). 
3.1  Quality indicators 
The data on hospital quality comes from the Basis Data Set of the Dutch Health Care 
Inspectorate (IGZ).
9 This dataset covers the period 2004-2008 and includes all Dutch general 
and academic hospitals.
10 There are almost 100 of such hospitals in the Netherlands, 8 of which 
are academic hospitals. In addition to academic hospitals, 26 general hospitals provide teaching 
and research possibilities, the so-called ‘medical teaching hospitals’.
11 These hospitals are 
typically middle-size or large general hospitals, offering the complete range of medical care. 
Since the dataset of the IGZ contains the names of hospitals, it is possible to merge it with the 
information from other sources. In particular, we have merged this dataset with the data on the 
all hospital locations and the number of beds from the National Institute for Public Health and 
Environment (RIVM).
12    
Table 3.1 shows some characteristics of hospitals in our dataset. According to Blank et al. 
(2008), Dutch hospitals are on average substantially larger than hospitals in other countries, 
with a greater number of beds. Table 3.1 also shows summary statistics for the  number of 
elective operations and the number of patients in the hospital’s recovery room over the year. 
These variables relate to the hospital scale, but also illustrate the intensity of hospital activities. 
Finally, the table shows some characteristics of hospital intensive care (IC) units, such as their 
level, the number of intensivists at these units and the number of patient artificial respiration 
days. These characteristics are related to the severity of patients in the hospital. In general, a 
higher level of IC corresponds to more advanced care. Therefore, hospitals with a higher IC-
level typically have a greater number of intensivists and severer patients (who possibly have a 





9 De Inspectie voor de Gezondheidszorg (IGZ) in Dutch. 
10 We exclude four specialized hospitals: one eye-hospital (Oogziekenhuis Rotterdam), two orthopaedic clinics (Sint 
Maartensklinieken Nijmegen/Woerden) and one oncological hospital (Antoni van Leeuwenhoek ziekenhuis Amsterdam). 
11 Information about these hospitals is provided on http://www.stz-ziekenhuizen.nl/ 
12 The full name of RIVM is the Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu (The National institute for Public Health and 
Environment).    16 
Table 3.1  Summary statistics on hospital specific factors, 2004-2008  
Quality indicator  Mean  St.D.  Min
a)  Max  N.obs. 
           
Number of beds  486      293           0       1368  499  
Number of patients in the recovery room (over the year)  8242.26  6263.44  0  43008  379 
Number of elective operations  11698.17  6311.64  688  43008  437 
Level of intensive care (IC)  1.79  0.82  1  3  476 
Number of intensivists at IC  4.35  5.57  0  39  466 
Number of respiration days at IC  2252.04  2881.11  0  18673  380 
 
a) Zero minimum values for the number of patients in the recovery room and intensive care variables can arise for some separate locations 
of hospitals having several locations. A zero minimum value for beds arises because some hospitals in our dataset provide only aggregate 
number of beds, allocating them to the main location.  
 
In 2004 and 2005, the data on quality indicators were gathered retrospectively, that is, hospitals 
received the questionnaire about the previous year on January 1 of the subsequent year. As from 
2006, hospitals have received questionnaires in advance and have delivered them back to the 
Inspectorate at the end of the year (Van den Berg et al., 2009, p.23). The quality survey is 
divided into three broad classes of indicators: hospital-wide indicators, high-risk treatment 
indicators and special treatment indicators (the complete list and a description of each indicator 
are provided in Appendix). Each class of indicators comprises several dimensions of hospital 
care, summing up to 20 quality dimensions in total for each year. In this paper, we focus on 
indicators that were requested for at least 3 years and were relevant to all hospitals in our 
dataset.
13 See Appendix A for more detail about the survey and the indicators used in this paper.  
 
Table 3.2 shows summary statistics of the quality indicators considered. The indicators can be 
divided into three types: structure, process and outcome indicators.
14 The second column of 
Table 3.2 shows the respective types of indicators, as we classify them in our study. Most 
indicators are expressed as proportions. Only the indicators of care for diabetic patients are 




Table 3.3 shows the availability of the indicators over the period. Although all the hospitals 
participated in the survey, they not always delivered all the figures asked. Therefore, there is a 
variation in the degree of disclosure both across hospitals and across indicators. We observe an 
increase of openness over the requested indicators by the end of the period and virtually no 
 
13 We do not include the categories of indicators that were added in the last one or two years. Furthermore, we do not 
include category ‘Pregnancy’, where reporting problems were encountered, according to Berg et al. (2009). We also leave 
out the indicators of high risk operations, such as an aneurysm of the abdominal aorta (AAA) and an esophagus cardiac 
resection (OCR), since not all hospitals conduct these high-risk operations. Certain indicators, such as the number of 
operations and intensive care parameters, are included as control variables, rather than quality. 
14 The classification in these three types, suggested by Donabedian (1966), is accepted in the health economics literature. 
15 Fundoscopies and HbA1c-tests are the procedures to maintain the health condition of diabetic patients. See Appendix A 
for more detail about these indicators.   17 
reversion in disclosure decisions. This suggests that we can use a hazard specification in 
modelling these decisions (see section 4). 
Table 3.2  Summary statistics of quality indicators, 2004-2008   
Quality indicator  Type  Mean  St. D.  Min  Max  N 
             
Decubitus             
(1- Prevalence)  Outcome  0.95  0.03  0.77  1.00  457 
(1- Incidence)  Outcome  0.98  0.03  0.73  1.00  389 
             
Pain             
Share of patients in the recovery room for whom the score was measured  Process  0.89  0.24  0.00  2.16  373 
Share of patients with the pain score below 4  Outcome  0.83  0.17  0.07  1.00  151 
Share of patients with the pain score below 7  Outcome  0.92  0.105  0.27  1.00  152 
             
Cancelled operations: (1-Share cancelled)  Process  0.98  0.01  0.93  1.00  401 
             
Reoperations             
(1-Share of reoperations)  Outcome  0.99  0.02  0.89  0.99  103 
(1-Share of reoperations hernia)  Outcome  0.94  0.05  0.79  1.00  170 
(1-Share of reoperations colorectal)  Outcome  0.93  0.04  0.75  1.00  280 
             
Heart failures: Share of patients without readmissions for heart failure  Outcome  0.91  0.06  0.50  1.00  429 
             
AMI-mortality             
(1- AMI mortality pulled)  Outcome  0.94  0.03  0.84  1.00  323 
(1- AMI mortality during admission)  Outcome  0.93  0.04  0.81  0.99  177 
(1- AMI mortality within 30 days)   Outcome  0.93  0.04  0.81  1.00  441 
             
Cholecystomy: (1-Share of gall duct injuries)  Outcome  0.99  0.01  0.93  1.00  450 
             
Diabetes             
Number of HbA1c-tests per patient  Process  2.55  0.71  0.76  5.74  367 
Number of fundoscopy procedures per patient  Process  0.79  0.21  0.00  1.89  384 
             
Mamma tumor: Share with diagnoses within 5 days  Process  0.86  0.14  0.27  1.00  241 
             
Hip fracture: Share of 65+ patients operated within 1 day  Process  0.83  0.12  0.22  1.00  452 
             
Structure indicators             
Medication safety: share of shared information across sections  Structure  0.25  0.22  0.00  1.00  499 
Infection registration: participation in the national registration  Structure  0.68  0.46  0.00  1.00  440 
Complication registration: participation in the national registration  Structure  0.29  0.19  0.00  1.00  289 
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Table 3.3  Evolution of the rate of disclosure over the period 2004-2008 
Quality indicator  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
           
Decubitus           
(1- Prevalence)  0.81  0.83  1.00  1.00  0.95
a) 
(1- Incidence)  0.44  0.66  0.93  0.93  0.96 
           
Pain           
Share of patients in the recovery room for which the pain score was measured  0.40  0.61  0.88  0.94  0.93 
Share of patients with the pain score below 4  0.26  0.51  0.72  n.a.  n.a. 
Share of patients with the pain score below 7  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.67  0.89 
           
Cancelled operations: (1-Share cancelled)  0.45  0.75  0.94  0.94  0.95 
           
Reoperations           
(1-Share of reoperations)  0.41  0.57  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
(1-Share of reoperations hernia)  n.a.  0.71  0.96  n.a.  n.a. 
(1-Share of reoperations colorectal)  n.a.  n.a.  0.94  0.97  0.97 
           
Heart failures: Share of patients without readmissions for heart failure  0.63  0.79  0.97  0.97  0.96 
           
AMI-mortality           
(1- AMI mortality pulled)  0.33  0.35  0.72  0.92  0.95 
(1- AMI mortality during admission)  0.37  0.48  0.38  0.53  n.a. 
(1- AMI mortality within 30 days)   0.71  0.83  0.97  0.97  0.95 
           
Cholecystomy: (1-Share of gall duct injuries)  0.74  0.84  0.98  0.99  0.97 
           
Diabetes           
Number of HbA1c-checks per diabetic patient  0.42  0.61  0.73  0.96  0.97 
Number of fundoscopy procedures per patient  0.48  0.70  0.85  0.86  0.96 
           
Mamma tumor: Share of diagnoses within 5 days  0.71  0.81  0.86  n.a.  n.a. 
           
Hip fracture: Share of 65+ patients operated within 1 day  0.82  0.87  1.00  0.95  0.90 
           
Structure indicators           
Medication safety: share of shared information across sections  0.53  0.83  0.94  0.96  n.a. 
Infection registration: participation in the national registration  0.61  0.82  1.00  0.99  1.00 
Complication registration: participation in the national registration  n.a.  0.90  0.99  1.00  n.a. 
           
Number of observations  99  108  97  96  99 
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3.2  Measuring competition 
The issue of measuring hospital competition has been debated in the literature. This issue 
concerns both the type of the measure used (e.g., the number of competitors or HHI) and the 
definition of the geographic area within which hospitals compete with each other. See, for 
example, the discussion of advantages and disadvantages of different approaches in Cooper et 
al. (2010). Since there is no single way of measuring competition that would provide a perfect 
measure, in our analysis we use several measures that are relatively simple to construct, and we 
test the robustness of our results comparing them across these measures. 
 
In particular, we focus on three measures of competition: the number of competitors in the 
hospital catchment area (defined as a circle of a fixed radius around the hospital postcode zone), 
the number of competitors adjusted for the size of population, and the distance to the closest 
competitor. To investigate whether the choice of the radius of the catchment area affects the 
estimation results, we estimate model variants for three different radiuses (10, 15 and 20 km). 
Within these radiuses, hospitals are assumed to be competitors to each other. 
 
Next to hospitals, independent treatment centers can provide healthcare within the liberalized 
segment of hospital care. These suppliers are typically much smaller and have a narrow 
specialization. Thus, these centers may only compete with hospitals within certain specialisms. 
The entry of independent treatment centers has been allowed since 2005. However, their market 
share is still relatively small: just 4% of the liberalized segment in 2009 and less in earlier years 
(NZa, 2009). According to the Dutch regulator, Dutch hospitals still mainly compete with each 
other, and they see other general hospitals as their main competitors (NZa, 2009).
16 
 
The set of hospital locations has hardly changed over the period 2004-2008. There was also 
little merger activity among hospitals in this period: no mergers among academic hospitals and 
only three mergers among general hospitals. This contrasts to the earlier period, 1998-2003, in 
which the number of hospitals decreased by 16 (NZa, 2009.) 
 
One fourth of Dutch hospitals have one location. The rest have more than one location (either 
several hospital locations or some hospital locations and some policlinic locations
17). We will 
refer to hospitals comprising several locations as a ‘group’.
18 Locations that belong to the same 
group do not compete with each other. In fact, they often share specialists and refer patients 
 
16 The authors’ translation of the original text in Dutch “Ook dit jaar komt uit de antwoorden in de vragenlijsten naar voren dat 
een grote meerderheid van de ziekenhuizen, andere ziekenhuizen als belangrijkste concurrenten ervaart.” (NZa, 2009, 
p.22.) 
17 Policlinic locations are locations of outpatient treatment centres. 
18 Some of these groups, typically those that merged some years ago, have reported quality on the aggregate group level. In 
contrast, those that merged relatively recently reported data at the location level for some years, while reporting the 
aggregate data for some other years.     20 
between each other if necessary. Therefore, when constructing the number of hospitals within a 
fixed radius from a certain location, we count each group as a single competitor. A group is 
counted as a competitor if at least one of its locations falls within the circle. The indicators of 
competition were constructed based on the full set of hospitals and their locations and merged 
with the dataset on quality, taking the location of the largest hospital within the group as the 
location of the group. This assumption is consistent with the presence of one board of directors 
in each group. 
 
The second measure of competition that we consider accounts for population density. We use 
the population data at the level of postcode from the Central Bureau of Statistics of the 
Netherlands, to compute the size of the population per catchment area. Table 3.4 shows the 
summary statistics of the respective indicators of competition; and Table 3.5 shows correlations 
between them. Here notation An corresponds to the number of competitors within n km from 
the hospital, and Bn is equal to An divided by the population within n km from the hospital. As 
expected, indicators An and Bn are positively correlated, and both are negatively correlated with 
indicator C. 
Table 3.4  Competition indicators 
Competition indicator  Mean  St. D.  Min  Max  N. Obs 
           
A10: The number of hospitals within 10 km  1.60  2.21  0  8  499 
A15: The number of hospitals within 15 km  2.97  3.38  0  12  499 
A20: The number of hospitals within 20 km  4.66  4.23  0  15  499 
B10: A10 divided by the population within 10 km  0.31  0.34  0  .97  499 
B15: A15 divided by the population within 15 km  0.38  0.30  0  .88  499 
B20: A20 divided by the population within 20 km  0.49  0.22  0  1.02  499 
C: Distance to the closest competitor (in km)  11.57  7.61  0  36.17  499 
 
a) Non-integer numbers arise because we take average over the postcode zones  
 
Table 3.5  Correlations between competition indicators 
  A10  A15  A20  B10  B15  B20  C 
               
A10  1             
A15  0.92  1           
A20  0.86  0.96  1         
B10  0.84  0.77  0.72  1       
B15  0.68  0.81  0.75  0.74  1     
B20  0.39  0.46  0.56  0.36  0.49  1   
C  – 0.69  – 0.73  – 0.70  – 0.78  – 0.78  – 0.44  1 
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4  Empirical model 
We have argued earlier that the primary interest of our analysis lies in the effect of competition 
on hospital quality indicators. When estimating this effect, however, one should be aware that 
the quality indicators are not disclosed for all hospitals and for all yearly observations. Since it 
may well be that the decisions affecting quality and its disclosure are mutually interdependent, 
our modeling approach entails a joint estimation of the disclosure decision of quality indicators 
and the values of the disclosed indicators. In doing this, we recognize that the initial costs of 
disclosing quality information may be substantial. Hence, instead of being a year-to-year 
decision, disclosure typically applies to all future years in the time period under consideration 
as well. Consequently, we model the disclosure decision as a duration process, with time 
measured as a discrete variable. Quality information is thus observed for the subset of hospitals 
that have disclosed information. To take into account this self-selection by hospitals, we allow 
for correlation in the unobserved terms of both processes. We use a Logit specification for the 
discrete disclosure probability θ and a Normal distribution for the quality outcomes y for 
hospital i ( i = 1,.., 103 ), quality indicator j ( j = 1,.., 18 ) measured in year t ( t = 1,.., 5 ).  
 
(1)  ln { θijt / ( 1   θijt ) }   =   X βj + ψj ( t ) + νij 
 
(2)   yijt      =   X γj + fj( t ) + υij + εijt 
 
with εijt ~ N( 0 , σijt
2 ) and  
 
(3)  σijt




Here, equation (1) makes apparent that the disclosure hazard is modeled using the familiar 
Mixed Proportional Hazard (MPH) model specification with time varying coefficients, while 
using discrete time durations. Equation (2) characterizes quality, and equation (3) specifies the 
variance for the heteroscedastic error term εijt used in equation (2). We describe the variables 
and parameters included in each equation in more detail below.      
 
In equations (1) and (2), X includes time variant and time invariant variables that may affect 
both the disclosure decision and the respective quality indicator value. The effects of these 
variables are described by the parameter vectors β and γ, respectively. The main variable of 
interest here is our measure of competition. In addition to competition, we include hospital 
characteristics, regional characteristics, and a linear time trend in both equations. We also 
control for the level of transparency of competitors in equation (1). Among the hospital 
characteristics, we include a teaching hospital dummy, bed number, patient number, number of 
elective operations, and the number of intensivists at the hospital intensive care unit. As a   22 
regional characteristic, we include regional mortality in order to correct for the health status of 
the population in the area.
19 Mortality data are available at the Netherlands Central Bureau of 
Statistics at the level of postcodes. We use this data together with the data on the size of 
population within the postcode area to construct the indicators of mortality within the catchment 
area of each hospital. 
 
Next to the set of variables X, equations (1) and (2) include time-trend variables. Function ψ (t) 
in equation (1) represents the effect of calendar time on the disclosure probability. In principle, 
this function can be specified by using year dummies. Since the starting date in our sample is 
the same for all hospitals and quality measures, the coefficient values of ψ also capture the 
effect of genuine duration dependence   that is, the remaining hospitals that have not disclosed 
this information so far become either more or less likely to disclose as time evolves. As 
calendar time effects may also be relevant for the observed quality levels, this effect is 
represented by f (t) in equation (2) as well.  
 
Equation (3) shows that the error terms of the quality equations are specified as heteroscedastic 
functions with σ0j
2 as baseline values per quality indicator. The variance of the error terms is 
allowed to vary with the sample size of the number of observations Sijt for hospital i at time t 
underlying the construction of the respective quality indicator j. Hospital quality indicators 
represent an average for a certain subsample of the patients treated, and thus may be sensitive to 
measurement errors.
20 Therefore, the efficiency of quality coefficient estimates improves when 
the patient group over which the average is taken increases. In particular, one would expect the 
variance to decrease in the sample size (α(j) < 0 ), which is taken into account by the 
heteroscedastic specification of the error terms. Within the context of reported hospital quality 
information, the interpretation of the error term in equation (3) is twofold. First, quality 
outcomes are driven by factors that vary over time and cannot be observed – as in any model 
with random effects. The second interpretation is that the outcomes can be measured with error. 
Under classical assumptions, these ‘left-hand-side’ measurement errors only affect the 
efficiency of estimated effects (Hausman 2001).  
In both equations (1) and (2), we allow for unobserved, time constant effects per combination of 
hospital i and quality outcome j. These are represented by νij and υij , respectively. We specify 
these random effects using a non-parametric bivariate distribution of mass points to 
 
19 Hospitals that face more competition are typically located in more densely populated areas, with more diverse population. 
It is plausible that they serve patient groups that are on average less healthy, causing a severer case mix for these 
hospitals. Without a correction for the health status, the estimates of competition effects will be biased downwards. 
20 These undesirable effects occur when the sample of patients that is used to measure the indicator does not represent the 
hospital population for which the indicator was relevant, or when the group of patients is small and an outlier has a large 
effect on the average. These problems are well known in the literature on measuring hospital quality. See, e.g., Dimnick et 
al. (2004) and Zaslavsky (2001).   23 
approximate their distributions.
21 We thus follow Heckman and Singer (1984), who have 
proposed this specification for the non-parametric estimation of (univariate) duration models. 
More specifically, we take the joint distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity terms νij and υij 





b as the points of support of ν and υ, respectively. The associated probabilities are 
denoted as follows: 
 




a ) = paa , 




b ) = pab ,   




a ) = pba , 




b ) = pbb 
 
with 0 ≤ pkl ≤ 1 for k = a, b and l = a, b and pbb = 1   paa   pab   pba . 
 
By modeling the joint distribution of mass points, we take explicit account of the fact that the 
decision to disclose quality information and the actual (observed) values of quality indicators 
may be correlated. A simple test for this entails the computation of the covariance of ν and υ: 
 
  cov( ν, υ)   =  ( paa pbb   pab pba ) ( ν
b   ν
a ) ( υ
a   υ
b ). 
 
All together, the parameters of our model for each quality indicator j are 
 
{ βj , ψj , γj , fj , σj0 






that can be estimated by Maximum Likelihood. Conditional on the values of ν and υ, the 
likelihood contribution L explaining the disclosure duration τ and quality outcomes y of hospital 
i and indicator j is equal to  
 
(4)  L ( τij, yijt | ν , υ )  =  θij,τ Пt=τ-1 [ 1   θijt ]  ×  Пt=τ φ (yijt ) / σijt
2,  
 
with φ ( . ) indicating the standard normal distribution density function. Equation (4) can be 
integrated out over the discrete distribution of ν and υ, yielding the integrated Likelihood:  
 
(5)   L ( τij, yijt )   =   Σk=a,b Σl=a,b  pkl L (τij, yijt | νk , υl ). 
 
 
21 By including random effects in our specification, the (total) disturbance terms in our models cannot be regarded as (fully) 
independent draws. Thus, clustering effects are controlled for and the standard errors of our explanatory variables are 
consistent.   24 
When estimating equation (5), special interest lies in the number of mass points and respective 
weights that can be estimated. With four mass points and two parameters for the unobserved 
effects (ν
a and υ
a ) that are absorbed by the constant terms in the equations, we have three 
probability parameters and two unobserved effect parameters that can be estimated. It however 
often occurs in practice that corner solutions are obtained for the probability parameters. This 
reduces the effective number of mass points. We return to this issue when discussing our 
estimation results. 
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5  Empirical results 
We have estimated the bivariate model presented in section 4 for 18 separate quality indicators 
(representing 10 quality dimensions from the Basis Data Set of the IGZ) and the seven different 
measures of competition described in section 3. As already mentioned, we have included both 
process indicators and outcome indicators. Where it was possible, the indicators have been 
expressed as percentages and transformed in such a way that their increase corresponds to an 
improvement of quality.
22 For example, instead of using the percentage of re-operations itself, 
we use the complementary indicator ‘100% minus the percentage of re-operations’. 
 
In this section, we first discuss our results concerning quality (sections 5.1 and 5.2), followed 
by results on disclosure and model parameters (section 5.3). 
5.1  Effect of competition on quality 
Table 5.1 shows the estimation results for the effect of competition on quality. In nearly all 
regressions we find a significant negative effect of competition on quality in terms of decubitus 
prevalence and cancelled operations; and positive on the frequency of HbA1c-tests of diabetic 
patients. The effect of competition is also significant (although less often) for several other 
quality indicators: a negative effect on the share of hip-fracture-injury operations to 65+ 
patients made within 1 day, and positive effects for the number of fundoscopies for diabetic 
patients, completing diagnoses within 5 days, and pain checks.
23 For the rest of indicators, the 
effect of competition is insignificant.  
 
Note that we typically find significant effects of competition on process indicators and 
insignificant on outcome indicators, except for the negative effect on the indicator concerning 
decubitus prevalence. The interpretation of the latter effect, however, is not straightforward, 
since the definition of decubitus prevalence that was used in the questionnaire makes no 
distinction in degrees 2-4 of decubitus, hence neglecting differences in the severity of patients’ 
conditions. Moreover, possibly not all hospitals used the same definition of decubitus in this 
period (Houwing et al., 2007). A possible reason for the more pronounced effect of competition 
on process indicators, rather than on outcome indicators, may be that hospitals have more 
control over process quality rather than over outcome quality, which is also influenced by the 
patients’ conditions. Hence, our finding lends support to the argument made by Baker (2000). 
 
22 For many indicators in our dataset (e.g., for AMI-mortality) the monotonicity of their relationship to quality is obvious. 
However, for some indicators (e.g. for cancelled operations and test frequency) the relationship to quality is not monotonous. 
This means that the interpretation that an increase of the respective indicator corresponds to an improvement of quality is 
only valid within the relevant range of values. This interpretation agrees with the explanation given in the questionnaire that 
was used for the collection of these indicators.  
23 Note that when the effect of competition on a quality indicator is significant, all our measures of competition result in the 
same direction of the effect (i.e., the same sign of the coefficients in columns on A and B and an opposite sign in column C).   26 
To assess the relative magnitude of the effects found, we look at the observed difference in 
quality between the most competitive and the least competitive areas. Table B1 (Appendix B) 
shows the expected difference in quality indicators between a hospital that has no competitors 
in its catchment area and a hospital with the largest number of competitors in its area. For 
example, column A10 in this table shows the difference between a hospital without competitors 
within 10 km and a hospital with 8 competitors within 10 km (since the maximum value of A10 
in our sample is equal to 8). For the quality indicators for which the effect of competition is 
significant, the effects vary between 30% and 80% of standard deviations.  
 
The effects of competition on process indicators can be interpreted in the following way. First, 
we find a negative effect of competition on quality measured by the indicators related to 
operation planning (cancelled operations and hip fracture injury operations for patients of 
65+).
24 A larger share of short-term cancellations of planned operations, as well as longer 
waiting times for operations on (acute) hip fracture injuries of 65+ patients in competitive areas 
probably indicate that hospitals in these areas tend to plan tighter. Secondly, we observe a 
positive effect of competition on pain checks in the hospital recovery room, checks of diabetic 
patients, and diagnoses within 5 days concerning mamma cancer. This may indicate the 
increased attention of hospital management to these activities. 
 
These effects are consistent with the hypothesis that hospitals in more competitive areas might 
experience more pressure on profit margins and therefore have stronger incentives to increase 
their production efficiency. On the one hand, the pressure to improve efficiency increases the 
utilization of hospitals’ resources, making the hospitals plan tighter. On the other hand, it 
creates the incentive to focus on improving the hospital processes that may be beneficial for the 
hospital. For example, certain process indicators (such as timely diagnoses, or perhaps also test 
frequency for chronic patients) may be interpreted by patients as a ‘signal’ of quality. Then the 
presence of competitors strengthens the hospital’s incentive to perform well on these particular 
indicators, since the hospital would like to prevent their patients from choosing a competitor. 
All together, this may rationalize why we observe a negative effect on indicators concerning 
operation planning and a positive effect on indicators concerning test frequency for chronic 
patients and diagnostic.  
 
We conclude that competition between hospitals does have effect on hospital quality, but this 
effect has so far shown only in process quality, not in outcome quality. The direction of the 
effect depends on the type of indicator, indicating that hospitals under more competitive 
pressure have a stronger incentive for efficiency. The finding of a better performance of 
hospitals in competitive areas on indicators which may be seen by patients as a signal of a 
 
24 Short term cancellations of planned operations are stressful for patients. Delays of hip fracture injury operations to 65+ 
patients substantially decreases full recovery chances for these patients.    27 
higher quality possibly indicates that hospital competition makes hospitals to improve these 
aspects of quality.  
5.2  Effect of control variables on quality 
Table 5.2 shows the results on control variables in the equation for quality. We confine the 
presentation of the results to the regressions with the competition measure B10. The results of 
regressions with other competition indicators are qualitatively similar to the results in Table 5.2. 
 
With respect to hospital characteristics, we find that larger hospitals (the size been measured by 
beds, operation number and patient number) perform better than other hospitals on preventing 
decubitus, reducing pain for patients during their recovery after operations and helping AMI-
patients, but worse on reoperations. For the indicator of cancelled planned operations, the effect 
of scale is not straightforward. The results show that more beds are associated with more 
cancellations, while more elective operations are associated with fewer cancellations. When 
combining these two findings, it seems that hospitals with a larger number of elective 
operations per bed cancel operations less often. Although this seemingly contradicts to our 
earlier finding about tighter planning of operation by hospitals, these two results can be 
reconciled with each other as follows. Firstly, operation cancellations on short notice are likely 
to be caused by the shortage of doctors or operation room capacity, rather than by the shortage 
of bed capacity. Secondly, reverse causality may play a role here, since for a given number of 
operations planned by a hospital, more cancellations imply that fewer operations are actually 
performed. 
 
Regarding the control variables that were included to correct for patient mix, we find that the 
teaching status is associated with less decubitus incidence, but with a greater share of cancelled 
operations. This is perhaps due to the better use of decubitus prevention techniques but severer 
patient mix at these hospitals. As expected, regions with a higher mortality have also higher 
AMI-mortality rates, reflecting the effect of a worse health status in these regions.
25  
 
Last but not least, the effect of time is positive and highly significant for many quality 
indicators considered. Interestingly, we observe also improvements over time in outcome 
indicators, namely in decubitus, AMI and reoperations, as well as in both process indicators 
related to operation planning (cancelled operations and hip fracture injury operations). This 
effect may be due to the increasing quality disclosure and policy attention to quality in this 
period. The country-wide learning effects that were triggered by policy changes probably 
assisted to improving average quality of Dutch hospitals. This effect, however, cannot be 
 
25 One can argue that the effect can go both ways. However, AMI is responsible only for a small share of death in the region.    28 
separately identified, as we cannot separate it from other time-related effects, such as the effect 
of new technology.    
5.3  Results on disclosure and model parameters 
Table 5.3 presents the results for the disclosure equation in regressions that employ B10 as a 
measure of competition.
26 Generally, we find no significant effects for the effects of 
competition on disclosure decisions, while find strong positive effects of scale and, sometimes, 
of time trend. In particular, we observe a positive significant (95% and higher) effect of the 
following variables: ‘number of elective operations’ (8 times), ‘patient number’ (5 times), and 
‘number of IC-intensivists’ (two times). Since these three variables relate to hospital scale, at 
least to some extent, these results signify a positive effect of hospital scale on disclosure. We 
also find a significant positive effect of time on the disclosure of the indicators of cancelled 
operations and pain-scores. This indicates some acceleration in the disclosure rate of these 
indicators over time. The effects of other variables are insignificant. Therefore, summarizing 
the results on disclosure, we conclude that the hospital disclosure decisions have probably been 
driven by scale rather than by competition.  
 
Table 5.4 shows the results for other model parameters. We have argued earlier that the 
bivariate setup of our model with unobserved (‘random’) effects allows for correlation between 
the disclosure decision and the quality measures. This correlation is determined by the 
probability parameters, together with unobserved effect parameters. For all variables, the best 
fit to the data of our model is obtained for parameter values where there is full correlation 
between the processes, that is, when pab = pba = 0. This means that there are two mass points for 
which the unobserved effects are allowed to vary. For 9 quality variables the implied correlation 
is negative, whereas for 9 quality variables it is positive. It should be stressed however that the 
value estimates of the unobserved heterogeneity terms for the disclosure decision are 
insignificant in most cases, rendering the implied correlation estimates insignificant as well. 
Thus, it seems that the disclosure decision of individual quality measures has not been 
influenced by the expected gains from transparency for hospitals with higher than average 
quality scores due to more demand for their services. This confirms our earlier finding that the 
disclosure decision of hospitals is typically not influenced by competition. Moreover, our 
estimates of the competition parameters remain virtually unchanged when unobserved effects in 
the disclosure decision model are assumed to be equal zero.  
 
26 The results using other competition measures are similar. In addition to the indicators of competition, we have also 
controlled in the disclosure equation for the average degree of disclosure by competitors. The respective variable was 
constructed as an average of the disclosure decisions by the hospitals in the catchment area over all the indicators, 
accounting only the indicators that were available for all years. The idea was that a hospital’s disclosure decision may be 
affected by the rate of disclosure in the neighborhood; in particular, more disclosure by competitors could put pressure on 
the hospital to disclose. However, we have never found a significant effect of this variable.    29 
In contrast to the disclosure decision, we find the quality levels to be driven by unobserved, 
time constant hospital-specific effects to some extent. In our model, the explained variance in 
quality outcomes comes from two sources: the hospital specific random effects and the residual 
variance. The respective effects are captured by the terms υij and εijt in equation (2) of the 
model. As the last column of Table 5.4 shows, the share of the hospital-specific effect in most 
cases ranges from to 12 to 40% of the total explained variance; exceptions are the share of 
cancelled operations (43%), the share of (all) reoperations (69%) and the AMI-mortality rate 
within 30 days (52%). Furthermore, the coefficient estimates of ‘scale’ in Table 5.4 capture the 
relation between the size of the patient sample used and the quality indicator’s variance. Our 






27 Exceptions are the indicators of decubitus. The standard deviation of an indicator can increase with the size of the 
sample, if an indicator was initially available only for a targeted very homogeneous group of patients, but later become to be 
measured for a more diverse group of patients.   30 
Table 5.1  Effect of competition on quality 
  A10  A15  A20  B10  B15  B20  C 
Decubitus               
(1- Prevalence)  – 0.230**  – 0.171***  – 0.137***  – 1.026**  – 2.039***  – 0.333  0.053* 
  (0.093)  (0.051)  (0.040)  (0.508)  (0.527)  (0.745)  (0.028) 
(1- Incidence)  0.030  0.011  0.002  0.120  0.311  – 0.114  – 0.007 
  (0.060)  (0.039)  (0.034)  (0.436)  (0.466)  (0.731)  (0.018) 
Pain               
Pain checks in the recovery room  0.997  0.503  0.389  4.575  4.749  18.742***  – 0.291* 
  (0.610)  (0.410)  (0.341)  (3.510)  (4.467)  (6.095)  (0.170) 
Pain score below 4  0.571  0.424  0.379  1.246  4.191  5.755  – 0.184 
  (0.707)  (0.439)  (0.367)  (3.862)  (4.501)  (5.970)  (0.144) 
Pain score below 7  0.151  0.116  0.141  – 0.750  0.024  3.069  – 0.040 
  (0.618)  (0.373)  (0.296)  (4.231)  (3.813)  (4.469)  (0.151) 
               
Cancelled operations   – 0.132***  – 0.089***  – 0.065***  – 0.531***  – 0.729***  – 0.974***  0.024*** 
(1-Share cancelled)  (0.020)  (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.133)  (0.148)  (0.239)  (0.006) 
               
Unplanned reoperations               
(1– Share of reoperations)  0.010  – 0.001  0.000  – 0.182  0.141  0.034  0.003 
  (0.047)  (0.029)  (0.023)  (0.261)  (0.362)  (0.579)  (0.015) 
(1-Share of reoperations hernia)  0.213  0.117  0.094  1.449  0.444  3.208  – 0.040 
  (0.221)  (0.137)  (0.104)  (1.113)  (1.403)  (2.123)  (0.064) 
(1-Share of reoperations colorectal)  0.141  0.064  0.066  1.028  1.149  1.395  – 0.033 
  (0.132)  (0.088)  (0.065)  (0.876)  (0.987)  (1.083)  (0.034) 
               
Heart failures   0.047  – 0.005  0.042  0.565  0.066  2.139  0.026 
No readmissions for heart failure  (0.152)  (0.084)  (0.065)  (1.039)  (1.010)  (1.570)  (0.042) 
               
AMI- mortality               
(1- AMI mortality pulled)  – 0.049  – 0.045  – 0.044  – 0.104  – 0.159  – 0.783  – 0.014 
  (0.094)  (0.058)  (0.044)  (0.532)  (0.595)  (1.057)  (0.025) 
(1- AMI mortality during admission)  – 0.091  – 0.071  – 0.039  – 0.473  – 0.652  – 1.004  0.014 
  (0.096)  (0.061)  (0.047)  (0.627)  (0.697)  (1.213)  (0.032) 
(1- AMI mortality within 30 days)   – 0.097  – 0.037  – 0.018  – 0.967  – 0.312  – 0.716  0.018 
  (0.167)  (0.111)  (0.085)  (0.812)  (0.925)  (1.471)  (0.045) 
               
Cholecystomy   – 0.006  – 0.004  – 0.010  0.004  – 0.062  – 0.115  – 0.002 
No gall duct injury  (0.017)  (0.014)  (0.011)  (0.100)  (0.171)  (0.215)  (0.006) 
               
Diabetes               
Number of HbA1c-tests per patient  0.037**  0.028***  0.024***  0.220**  0.242*  0.543***  – 0.014** 
  (0.015)  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.104)  (0.136)  (0.181)  (0.006) 
Fundoscopy   1.027  0.587*  0.450*  (5.350  7.065*  6.078  – 0.305** 
  (0.683)  (0.351)  (0.251)  (4.288)  (3.825)  (5.253)  (0.154) 
               
Mamma tumor   1.151*  0.719**  0.444*  7.429**  6.386*  1.668  – 0.229 
Share of diagnoses within 5 days  (0.601)  (0.346)  (0.263  (3.058)  (3.309)  (5.480)  (0.145) 
               
Hip fracture                
Share of 65+ patients operated  – 0.740*  – 0.560**  – 0.410**  – 4.179*  – 5.731*  – 0.928  0.089 
within 1 day  (0.404)  (0.268)  (0.205)  (2.404)  (3.243)  (3.296)  (0.110) 
The stars indicate the significance levels: * 90%; **95% and ***99%. 
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Decubitus                 
(1- Prevalence)  91.158***  – 1.634  0.000  0.001***  0.000  0.286  0.683***  0.239 
  (1.775)  (1.107)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.741)  (0.089)  (0.184) 
(1- Incidence)  92.469***  – 0.341  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.993***  0.493***  0.100 
  (1.177)  (0.489)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.382)  (0.120)  (0.141) 
Pain                 
Pain checks in the recovery room  34.749***  8.517  – 0.002  – 0.204  – 0.007  1.898  2.680**  0.936 
  (8.890)  (9.250)  (0.005)  (0.219)  (0.020)  (4.193)  (1.111)  (0.870) 
Pain score below 4  71.149***  – 5.459  0.014***  0.006  – 0.001  4.046  – 0.002  – 0.829 
  (10.057)  (4.893)  (0.003)  (0.007)  (0.004)  (2.675)  (2.015)  (1.159) 
Pain score below 7  56.194**  – 0.689  0.000  0.001  – 0.002  0.538  2.131  – 0.095 
  (23.902)  (5.317)  (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.038)  (2.833)  (2.842)  (0.682) 
                 
Cancelled operations   95.759***  – 1.128***  0.044***  0.000  0.000  – 0.469***  0.093**  0.062 
(1-Share cancelled)  (0.487)  (0.165)  (0.009)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.111)  (0.042)  (0.051) 
                 
Unplanned reoperations                 
(1– Share of reoperations)  96.181***  – 1.414**  0.000  0.000  – 0.001  – 0.355  0.017  – 0.075 
  (0.965)  (0.639)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.387)  (0.268)  (0.085) 
(1-Share of reoperations hernia)  88.200***  1.688  0.003  – 0.001  – 0.002  – 0.666  3.290***  – 0.387 
  (3.013)  (1.612)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (1.160)  (0.632)  (0.320) 
(1-Share of reoperations colorectal)  90.036***  – 0.789  – 0.001  0.000  – 0.004  – 0.714  0.434*  – 0.097 
  (3.226)  (1.341)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.004)  (0.780)  (0.248)  (0.315) 
                 
Heart failures   85.434***  2.408*  – 0.002*  0.000  0.003***  – 1.186  0.445**  – 0.032 
No readmissions for heart failure  (2.504)  (1.378)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.779)  (0.220)  (0.238) 
                 
AMI- mortality                 
(1- AMI mortality pulled)  92.529***  0.265  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.491  1.117***  – 0.415*** 
  (1.326)  (0.769)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.593)  (0.107)  (0.161) 
(1- AMI mortality during admission)  92.845***  0.474  0.001**  – 0.001  0.001  0.209  1.122***  – 0.408** 
  (1.610)  (0.838)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.594)  (0.129)  (0.175) 
(1- AMI mortality within 30 days)   93.815***  0.585  – 0.001  0.001*  – 0.001  – 0.032  0.936***  – 0.767*** 
  (1.863)  (1.253)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.915)  (0.239)  (0.238) 
                 
Cholecystomy   92.655***  – 0.251*  0.000**  0.000  0.000  0.107  0.060**  – 0.001 
No gall duct injury  (0.123)  (0.134)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.081)  (0.027)  (0.030) 
                 
Diabetes                 
HbA1c-checks per patient  2.225***  0.355*  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.010  0.044*  – 0.038 
  (0.298)  (0.198)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.130)  (0.024)  (0.031) 
Fundoscopy   43.799***  3.786  0.005  0.003  0.002  – 6.572  1.359  1.569 
  (11.073)  (7.210)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.008)  (4.153)  (0.917)  (1.122) 
                 
Mamma tumor  83.951***  – 2.131  0.001  0.004  0.002  – 0.369  – 0.803  – 1.567* 
Share of diagnoses within 5 days  (10.557)  (4.837)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.005)  (2.851)  (1.599)  (0.941) 
                 
Hip fracture                  
Share of operations of 65+ patients   82.471***  – 7.317  0.003  0.001  0.002  1.092  0.702*  – 0.495 
within 1 day  (6.833)  (4.550)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (2.477)  (0.412)  (0.713) 
 
The stars indicate the significance levels: * 90%; **95% and ***99%. 
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Decubitus                 
(1- Prevalence)  2.754  1.592  0.002**  0.000  0.001  – 0.605  0.460  – 0.097 
  (2.053)  (1.067)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.780)  (0.642)  (0.303) 
(1- Incidence)  0.806  – 0.723  0.001***  0.001**  0.001  0.127  0.322  – 0.007 
  (1.353)  (0.832)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.471)  (0.227)  (0.165) 
Pain                 
Pain checks in the recovery  0.288  – 0.705  – 0.024  0.290  – 0.005  – 1.719  0.970  – 0.505 
  (50.321)  (7.942)  (0.333)  (0.499)  (0.431)  (3.707)  (2.519)  (1.081) 
Pain score below 4  – 0.386  0.508  0.001  0.002***  0.000  – 0.574  0.153  0.321* 
  (1.078)  (0.839)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.506)  (0.244)  (0.164) 
Pain score below 7  0.313  0.916  0.001  0.001  0.002  – 0.703  1.367**  – 0.125 
  (1.436)  (1.213)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.004)  (0.709)  (0.660)  (0.234) 
                 
Cancelled operations   – 1.416  – 0.850  0.049  0.000  0.000  0.002  0.654*  0.068 
(1-Share cancelled)  (1.827)  (1.441)  (0.069)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.853)  (0.356)  (0.253) 
                 
Unplanned reoperations                 
(1– Share of reoperations)  – 0.507  0.599  0.001  0.000  0.001  – 0.791  0.318  – 0.058 
  (1.289)  (0.921)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.588)  (0.543)  (0.226) 
(1-Share of reoper. hernia)  0.009  0.078  0.002**  0.000  0.000  – 1.259  1.062  – 0.077 
  (1.645)  (1.212)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.885)  (0.886)  (0.316) 
(1-Share of reoper. colorectal)  – 0.950  1.043  0.005  – 0.001  0.003  – 0.439  0.021  – 0.398 
  (3.715)  (4.373)  (0.004)  (0.007)  (0.009)  (3.809)  (3.785)  (0.816) 
                 
Heart failures   – 0.225  0.756  0.000  0.001**  0.001*  – 0.558  0.358  – 0.055 
No readmissions   (1.146)  (0.746)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.484)  (0.347)  (0.213) 
                 
AMI- mortality                 
(1- AMI mortality pulled)  1.592  0.834  0.001**  0.001**  0.001  – 0.617  – 0.110  0.052 
  (1.647)  (1.024)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.561)  (0.381)  (0.235) 
(1- AMI mortality during adm.)  – 0.775  0.710  0.000  0.000  0.001  – 0.398  0.462**  0.074 
  (1.132)  (0.573)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.377)  (0.184)  (0.155) 
(1- AMI mortality within 30  1.492  0.817  0.000  0.001**  0.000  – 0.870*  – 0.171  – 0.142 
  (1.105)  (0.869)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.508)  (0.253)  (0.126) 
                 
Cholecystomy  2.615*  – 0.007  0.001**  0.000  0.002**  – 1.189**  0.310  – 0.291 
No gall duct injury  (1.503)  (0.837)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.568)  (0.391)  (0.234) 
                 
Diabetes                 
HbA1c-checks per patient  0.991  – 0.018  0.001  0.000  0.001*  0.364  0.340*  – 0.012 
  (1.043)  (0.617)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.383)  (0.205)  (0.129) 
Fundoscopy  0.084  – 0.253  0.001**  0.001  0.001  – 0.173  0.225  0.133 
  (1.097)  (0.692)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.427)  (0.261)  (0.130) 
                 
Mamma tumor   1.666  – 1.488  0.001**  0.000  0.001  0.491  – 0.051  – 0.079 
Share of diagnoses within 5 d.  (1.706)  (1.126)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.787)  (0.524)  (0.231) 
                 
Hip fracture                 
Share of 65+ patients   0.015  – 1.477  0.001**  0.000  0.002**  0.101  – 0.238  0.090 
operated within 1 day  (1.868)  (1.709)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (1.017)  (0.524)  (0.274) 
The stars indicate the significance levels: * 90%; **95% and ***99%. 
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Table 5.4  Estimates of the other model parameters (competition measure B10) 
















Decubitus               
(1- Prevalence)  0.910***  – 0.191***  – 0.809  – 1.896  2.084***    0.12 
  (0.028)  (0.046)  (0.700)  (1.864)  (0.415)     
(1- Incidence)  0.829***  – 0.591***  – 1.758***  0.064  4.099***    0.15 
  (0.038)  (0.053)  (0.564)  (0.650)  (0.346)     
Pain               
Pain checks in the recovery room  2.902***  – 0.267***  – 1.662***  – 2.152  41.972***    0.34 
  (0.029)  (0.030)  (0.567)  (10.409)  (2.664)     
Pain score below 4  2.315***  – 0.254***  – 2.192***  – 1.167  25.639***    0.22 
  (0.084)  (0.039)  (0.788)  (1.917)  (3.494)     
Pain score below 7  2.148***  0.073  – 3.113  – 0.141  30.242*    0.35 
  (0.095)  (0.051)  (1.930)  (4.155)  (15.623)     
               
Cancelled operations   – 0.042  – 0.171**  – 1.725***  – 1.070  2.335***    0.43 
(1- Share cancelled)  (0.034)  (0.082)  (0.352)  (1.136)  (0.102)     
               
Unplanned reoperations             
(1- Share of reoperations)  – 0.014  0.425**  – 1.478*  2.473  3.831***    0.69 
  (0.093)  (0.201)  (0.840)  (1.809)  (0.468)     
(1- Share of reoperations hernia)  1.272***  – 0.314***  – 0.732  – 1.535  4.148***    0.21 
  (0.092)  (0.118)  (1.066)  (2.169)  (0.900)     
(1- Share of reoperations colorec.)  1.129***  0.005  – 0.485  2.496  4.156***    0.30 
  (0.046)  (0.089)  (0.387)  (2.367)  (0.588)     
               
Heart failures   1.473***  – 0.422***  – 1.291***  0.499  5.052***    0.15 
No readmissions for heart failure  (0.027)  (0.029)  (0.420)  (0.722)  (1.005)     
               
AMI– mortality             
(1- AMI mortality pulled)  0.940***  – 0.178***  – 0.220  – 0.613  3.224***    0.27 
  (0.037)  (0.057)  (0.363)  (0.935)  (0.291)     
(1-  AMI mortality during admission)  0.827***  – 0.270***  – 0.194  0.000  2.812***    0.25 
  (0.050)  (0.072)  (0.397)    (0.317)     
(1- AMI mortality within 30 days)   0.916***  – 0.012  – 0.364  1.558*  5.444***    0.53 
  (0.069)  (0.088)  (0.381)  (0.866)  (0.588)     
               
Cholecystomy   – 0.401***  – 0.517***  – 4.718  – 2.098  6.599***    0.41 
No gall duct injury  (0.024)  (0.073)  (4.442)  (163.524)  (0.123)     
               
Diabetes               
HbA1c- checks per patient  – 0.580***  – 0.215***  0.842***  0.346  0.902***    0.34 
  (0.029)  (0.048)  (0.284)  (0.478)  (0.070)     
Fundoscopy  2.888***  0.082**  – 1.292***  0.158  23.763***    0.23 
  (0.024)  (0.042)  (0.408)  (0.756)  (3.095)     
               
Mamma tumor   2.458***  – 0.123*  – 1.497**  2.294**  17.973***    0.25 
Share of diagnoses within 5 days  (0.045)  (0.067)  (0.684)  (0.981)  (4.889)     
               
Hip fracture               
Share of 65+ patients operated  2.344***  0.046  – 0.866*  – 0.696  12.177***    0.22 
within 1 day  (0.029)  (0.042)  (0.461)  (1.134)  (1.535)     
The stars indicate the significance levels: * 90%; **95% and ***99%.   34   35 
6  Conclusions 
This paper addresses the relationship between hospital competition and quality. While most 
econometric literature about the effect of competition on hospital quality focuses on outcome 
indicators of quality, we also include process indicators. We argue that the inclusion of process 
indicators contributes to a better understanding of the effects of competition on strategies 
employed by hospitals. Since hospitals generally have more control over their processes rather 
than over the resulting health outcomes for patients (which are also affected by patient 
conditions), the effect of competition may be more profound for process indicators. Indeed, we 
find a significant effect of competition between hospitals on nearly each process indicator 
included in the study, while we generally find no significant effect of competition on outcome 
indicators.  
 
More specifically, it appears that competition decreases quality in terms of cancelled planned 
operations and delays on acute hip fracture injury operations, while increases the frequency of 
tests to chronic patients and the share of diagnoses on mamma cancer made within 5 days. 
These effects suggest that competition between hospitals puts pressure on hospitals profit 
margins, forcing hospitals to employ strategies that improve their production efficiency. For 
example, one way to improve production efficiency entails the more intensive use of hospital 
operation capacity, which probably explains a greater proportion of cancellations (on short 
notice) and delays of operations in more competitive areas. Furthermore, competition may 
provide hospitals incentives to improve on quality indicators that can be easily observed by 
patients and perceived as a signal of quality (such as the time the patient has to wait for a 
diagnosis and check-up frequency for chronic patients). 
 
Interestingly, we find a positive significant effect of time trend on several outcome indicators 
(Decubitus, AMI, reoperations), indicating the improvement in outcome quality over time. The 
improving trend is also present in both indicators of cancelled operations and delayed hip-
fracture injury operations, thus compensating for the negative effect of competition on these 
particular process indicators. These findings suggest that the country-wide institutional changes 
that increased competitive pressure in the hospital sector and brought more attention to quality 
assisted to generic changes in hospitals quality, probably by facilitating learning from the best 
practice techniques.  
 
To cope with the possible selection effects in our sample, our modeling approach entails a joint 
estimation of the disclosure decision of quality indicators and the disclosed indicator values. 
Although for this particular dataset, the coefficient estimates from the full bivariate model 
appear to be close to those from a restricted model including two univariate equations, we argue 
that this generally should not be taken for granted in all institutional settings. Moreover, the   36 
bivariate model both provides a better fit and offers the possibility for crosschecking the 
interpretations of the effects found. Although we observe a gradual increase of the average 
disclosure rate of each indicator over the period considered, this does not seem to be driven by 
competitive pressure from the neighboring hospitals, but rather by the common belief that 
policy makers would enforce disclosure of quality information in the future. We therefore, 
conclude that policy attention to quality was the major contributing factor to the increased 
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Appendix A:  Description of the Basis Data Set 
Below, we provide more details on indicators included in the analysis. Table A1 at the end of 
the section gives an overview of the complete questionnaire and data availability. 
Decubitus 
Decubitus prevalence (share of patients with decubitus on a particular moment of time) and 
incidence (share of patients with decubitus for a certain relatively homogeneous group of 
patients, hip fracture patients in this case) show the quality of nursing in the hospital. These data 
were collected in each year of the questionnaire aggregated over degrees 2-4 of decubitus.  
Post-operation pain 
Post operation pain reflects the quality as experienced by patients. Different definitions of the 
pain score were used in 2004-2006 (pain score below 4) and in 2007-2008 (pain score above 7). 
Therefore, we include three separate indicators on pain in the analysis: share of patients in the 
hospital recovery room who were asked about their pain on a regular basis, share with a pain 
score below 4, share with a pain score above 7. 
Unplanned re-operations 
Hospitals report the number of patients operated as well as the number of re-operations. The 
availability of indicators depends on the year of the questionnaire. In particular, the data were 
reported either at the overall hospital level (in 2004-2005), or for some types of operations 
(hernia in 2005-2006
28 and colorectal operations in 2006-2008). 
Cancelled operations 
This indicator accounts for cancellations of planned operations made on short notice (<24 hours 
in advance). Both hospitals and patients can sometimes cancel operations. The number of 
operations cancelled by hospital is typically two or three times larger than the number of 
cancellations by patients. According to the IGZ, the inclusion of patient cancellations is 
important as well, since a patient is less likely to cancel if the hospital gives him a timely notice 
before the operation. Hence, we use the cumulative percentage of cancellations in the analysis. 
Cardiology 
In the dataset, the quality in cardiology is reflected by readmissions for heart failures and 
mortality rates from acute myocardinfarct (AMI). Prior to 2007, the data on cerebrovascular 
 
28 According to the questionnaire of 2007, data on hernia reoperations should be also available in 2007, however, the 
definition for this type of reoperations was revised in that year. Since some hospitals have not adjusted the definition, the 
data of 2007 appeared to be inconsistent across hospitals. (Source: IGZ (2008) "Het resultaat telt 2007".)   38 
accident (CVA) were collected as well, but the definition of this indicator has changed over the 
years. Therefore, we do not include CVA indicators in the analysis.  
 
The data on readmissions for heart failure are available for all years, split by age groups: under 
75 and above 75 years. Here we use an aggregated indicator that includes all ages. The AMI-
mortality rates also cover all ages. In the first three years, hospitals were asked to report 30-day 
AMI mortality rates, but if that figure was not readily available, it was sufficient to report 
hospital AMI-mortality rates (i.e. mortality during hospital admissions). Most hospitals report 
the second indicator, some report both, and some report only the first indicator. Both indicators 
were included in the questionnaire of 2007, whilst only the hospital AMI-mortality rate was 
requested in 2008. From the data on 2007, for which both indicators are available, it appears 
that the difference between the two is very small. Therefore, in addition to regressions with 
hospital AMI mortality and 30-day AMI-mortality, we also consider a ‘pooled AMI-indicator’, 
which takes the value of 30-day AMI mortality where that was available, and otherwise, takes 
the value of hospital AMI mortality. Although the results with respect to quality levels 
measured by the pooled indicator should be interpreted with care, the indicator provides a 
correct picture on disclosure of AMI-mortality. 
Diabetes Mellitus 
Regular control procedures for diabetic patients, such as HbA1c- level tests and fundoscopies, 
allow doctors to reveal problems and timely prescribe medicines to maintain the health of 
patients. Therefore, the frequency of these checks can be an important process indicator on 
diabetes. We include data on the share of patients controlled, as well as the number of 
fundoscopy procedures per registered patient.  
Mamma tumor
  
The percentage of test outcomes that are ready within 5 days reflects the policlinic quality of the 
hospital. This indicator was collected in 2004-2006. Later, it was replaced by new indicators 
reflecting the patient outcomes of the subsequent treatment. Hence we consider only the data on 
2004-2006 in our analysis. 
Hip fracture 
Patients with hip fracture injuries operated within one day usually have better outcomes. 
Especially for older patients, the chance on healthy life after this operation depends on the time 
within which the patient has been operated. Therefore, the quality is measured by the share of 
patients aged 65+ operated within one day. This indicator is available for all years. The split by 
degree (1-2 and 3-5) is available in some cases, but not always, especially in the first years of 
the questionnaire. Therefore, we use cumulative figures for degrees 1-5. 
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Table A1     Data availability: the indicators in each category and their availability in 2004-2008 
Indicator 
a)  Data availability 




Decubitus  Prevalence of decubitus degree 2-4 (2004-2008) 
Incidence decubitus for hip patients (2004-2008) 
 
Medication safety  11 subindicators of the availability of information (2004-2007)  
They concern clinically prescribed medications (in policlinics, nursing sections, pharmacies, 
outside the hospital); policlinically prescribed medications (in policlinics, nursing sections, 
pharmacies, outside the hospital); and externally prescribed medications (in policlinics, nursing 
sections, pharmacies).  
These are structure indicators, hence, not included in the analysis. 
 
ICT  18 sub-indicators of the availability of electronic data (2004-2008) 
They show the availability in the policlinic and in the department of administrative data; namely, 
laboratorial data; external correspondence; radiology; bacteriology; PA; medical data; operation 
reports; photo’s such as X-ray).  




Indicator of participation in the TRIP-registration (2004-2006)  





Indicator of participation in the registration system PREZIES measurement of incidence.  





Indicator of the scope of specialisms for which the hospital participates in the national 
registration and/or owns its own registration of complications. 
This is a structure indicator, hence, not included in the analysis. 
 
High-risk treatments   
Post-operation pain 
 
Share of post-operative patients for whom the score was measured within 72 h (2004-2008) 
Share with a systematically-measured score below 4 (2004-2006) 
Share with a systematically-measured score above 7 (2007-2008) 
Split between recovery and nursery is available in some cases. 
 




Share of unplanned reoperations (2004-2005) 
Share of unplanned reoperations for hernia (2005-2006) 
Share of unplanned colorectal reoperations (2006-2008) 
     
Cancelled operations  Share of operations cancelled by hospital (2004-2008) 
Share of operations cancelled by patients (2004-2008) 
 
Volume of high-risk 
interventions 
 
The number of two types of operations (AAA and OCR) 
Not included in the analysis, since the relation with quality is not straightforward. 
 
Intensive care (IC)  The level of IC; the number of artificial respiration days per patient; 
and the number of intensivists f.t.e. This indicator is included as a control variable. 
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Special treatments   
Diabetes mellitus  Tests HbA1c: Number of patients, number of measurements, and the sum of the values. 
Fundoscopy: Number of checks per patient (2004-2008) 
  
Cardiology
   Share of readmissions for heart failures for patients under and above 75 years (2004-2008)  
30-day AMI-mortality rates (split under and above 65 years)  
AMI-mortality during admission 
  
Hip fracture  Share of patients older than 65 year operated within one day (2004-2008) 
 
Mamma tumor  Share of tests on which the results were available within 5 days (2004-2006). 
 
Pregnancy  The respective indicator, called VOKS-score (from ‘Verloskundige Onderlinge 
Kwaliteitsverspigeling’ in Dutch), appears to be inconsistently reported (Van den Berg et al., 
2009, p.119), hence, not included in the analysis. 
 
a) We leave out the three indicators introduced in the last two years of the questionnaire (Undernourishment, Cataract and Child Surgery). 
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Appendix B. Relative magnitude of the effect of  
        competition on quality 
Table B1  Magnitude of the effect of competition expressed in terms of standard deviations of indicators 
Quality indicator  A10  A15  A20  B10  B15  B20  C 
               
Decubitus               
Share of patients checked  0.13  0.18  0.12  0.01  0.12  0.09  0.09 
(1- Prevalence)  0.59**  0.66***  0.66***  0.32**  0.58***  0.11  0.62* 
(1- Incidence)  0.07  0.04  0.01  0.04  0.08  0.04  0.08 
               
Pain               
Pain checks in the recovery room  0.334  0.25  0.24  0.18  0.17  0.79***  0.43* 
Pain score below 4  0.26  0.29  0.33  0.07  0.21  0.34  0.38 
Pain score below 7  0.11  0.13  0.20  0.07  0.00  0.29  0.14 
               
Cancelled operations               
(1-Share cancelled)  0.76***  0.76***  0.69***  0.37***  0.46***  0.71***  0.61*** 
               
Reoperations               
(1-Share of reoperations)  0.05  0.01  0.25  0.09  0.42  0.02  0.07 
(1-Share of reoperations hernia)  0.36  0.30  0.30  0.30  0.08  0.70  0.31 
(1-Share of reoperations colorectal)  0.30  0.25  0.27  0.26  0.30  0.41  0.32 
               
Heart failures               
No readmissions for heart failure  0.07  0.01  0.11  0.10  0.01  0.39  0.17 
               
AMI-mortality               
(1- AMI mortality pulled)  0.12  0.16  0.20  0.03  0.04  0.24  0.15 
(1- AMI mortality during admission)  0.18  0.21  0.16  0.11  0.15  0.28  0.10 
(1- AMI mortality within 30 days)   0.22  0.13  0.08  0.27  0.08  0.21  0.19 
               
Cholecystomy               
No gall duct injury  0.06  0.07  0.19  0.00  0.07  0.15  0.08 
               
Diabetes Mellitus               
Number of HbA1c-tests per patient  0.41**  0.48***  0.51***  0.30**  0.30*  0.78***  0.71** 
Fundoscopy   0.40  0.34*  0.33*  0.25  0.30*  0.30  0.53** 
               
Mamma tumor               
Share of diagnoses within 5 days  0.67*  0.63**  0.49*  0.53**  0.41*  0.12  0.60 
               
Hip fracture               
Share of 65+ patients operated within 1 day  0.49*  0.55**  0.50**  0.33*  0.41*  0.08  0.26 
 
The magnitude of the effect is computed as the maximum value of the competition indicator multiplied by the absolute value of the 
coefficient and divided by the standard deviation of the quality indicator. 
The stars indicate the significance levels: * 90%; **95% and ***99%.   43 
References 
Agarwal, R., C. Angst, J. Khuntia and J. McCullough, 2009, Determinants of Willingness to 
Voluntarily Disclose Quality of Care Information Among California Hospitals, WP presented at 
iHEA2009, Beijing, China.  
 
Baker, G., 2000, The Use of Performance Measures in Incentive Contracting, The American 
Economic Review, 90(2), 415-420. 
 
Berg van den, J.M., J. Haechk, M. van der Kolk and L. den Ouden, 2009, (Toe)zicht op 
ziekenhuizen. vijf jaar presteren met indicatoren, de Tijdstroom Publishers, the Netherlands.  
 
Bijlsma, M. and M. Pomp, 2008, Transparency of quality and competition in health care: 
Chances and dilemmas, CPB Document 164. 
 
Blank, J., C. Haelermans, P. Koot and O. van Putten-Rademaker, 2008, Schaal en Zorg: een 
internationale vergelijking, Schaal en Zorg Achtergrondstudies, RVZ. 
 
Blom, N, C. Propper, S.Seiler and J. Van Reenen, 2009, The impact of competition on 
management quality: evidence from public hospitals, NBER working paper 16032. 
 
Board, O., 2009, Competition and Disclosure, The Journal of Industrial Economics, 57(1),  
197-213. 
 
Zack Cooper, Z., S. Gibbons, S. Jones and A. McGuire, 2010, Does Hospital Competition 
Improve Efficiency? An Analysis of the Recent Market-Based Reforms to the English NHS, 
CEP Discussion Paper 988. 
 
Dimick, J.B., H.G. Welch and J.D. Birkmeyer, 2004, Surgical mortality as an indicator of 
hospital quality. The problem with small sample size, JAMA, 292, 847-851, http://jama.ama-
assn.org/cgi/content/abstract/292/7/847. 
Donabedian, 1966, Evaluating the quality of medical care, The Milbank Memorial Fund 
Quarterly, 44 (3), 166–206. 
Dranove, D., D. Kessler, M. McClellan and M. Satterthwaite, 2003, Is more information better? 
The effects of report cards on cardiovascular providers and consumers. Journal of Political 
Economy, 11(3), 555-588.  
   44 
Dranove, D. D. and M. A. Satterthwaite, 2000, The industrial organization of health care 
markets, in Culyer, A. and J.P. Newhouse eds., Handbook of Health Economics, (1B) chapter 
20, 1094–1139. Elsevier Science, North-Holland, New York and Oxford. 
 
Dranove, D. and G.Z. Jin, 2009, Quality Disclosure and Certification: Theory and Practice, 
under review at the Journal of Economic Literature.  
 
Espinosa W.E. and D.M. Bernard, 2005, Hospital finances and patient safety outcomes, Inquiry, 
42 (1), 60-72. 
 
Gavazza A. and A. Lizzeri, 2007, The Perils of transparency under bureaucracies, The 
American Economic Review, 97 (2), 300-305. 
 
Gaynor, M.S., 2006, What Do We Know About Competition and Quality in Health Care 
Markets?, NBER Working Paper W12301.  
 
Gaynor M., C. Propper, R. Moreno-Serra, 2010,  Death by Market Power: Reform, Competition 
and Patient Outcomes in the National Health Service, NBER Working Paper, W16164. 
 
Grossman, S. J. and Hart. O. D., 1980, Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids, Journal of 
Finance, 35, 323–334. 
 
Grossman, J., 1981, The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product 
Quality, Journal of Law and Economics, 24, 461-483. 
 
Halbersma, R.S., W. Kerstholt and M.C. Mikkers, 2009, Marktafbakening en marktmacht in de 
zorgsector, Markt & Mededinging, nr. 2 (April 2009),74 - 82, The Hague, the Netherlands. 
 
Henry, E., 2009, Strategic disclosure of research results: the cost of proving your honesty, The 
Economic Journal. 
 
Hausman, J., 2001, Mismeasured Variables in Econometric Analysis: Problems from the Right 
and Problems from the Left, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(4), 57-67. 
 
Heckman, J., and B. Singer, 1984, A Method for Minimizing the Impact of Distributional 
Assumptions in Econometric Models for Duration Data, Econometrica, 52(2), 271-320. 
 
Houwing, R.H., E.S.M. Koopman, J.R.E. Haalboom, 2007, Vochtigheidsletsel is gewone 
decubitus, Medisch contact, 03, 105-103.   45 
Jin,G.Z., 2005, Competition and Disclosure Incentives: An Empirical Study of HMOs, The 
RAND Journal of Economics, 36(1), 93-112. 
 
Jovanovic, B., 1982, Truthful Disclosure of Information, Bell Journal of Economics, 13, 36-44. 
 
McCormick, D., D.U. Himmelstein, S. Woolhandler, S.M. Wolfe and D.H. Bor, 2002, 
Relationship Between Low Quality-of-Care Scores and HMOs' Subsequent Public Disclosure 
of Quality-of-Care Scores, JAMA, 288(12), 1484-1490,  
http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/full/288/12/1484. 
  
Kessler, D. P., M. B. McClellan, 2006, Is Hospital Competition Socially Wasteful?, The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. l, 115 (2), 577-615. 
 
Levin, D., J. Peck and L. Ye, 2009, Quality Disclosure and Competition, The Journal of 
Industrial Economics, 57(1), 167-196.  
 
Milgrom, P. R., 1981, Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications, 
Bell Journal of Economics, 12, 380–391.  
 
NZa, 2004, ‘Lijst met ziekenhuisproducten met vrije prijzen vastgesteld’, press release, January 
19, 2004.  
 
NZa, 2009, Monitor Ziekenhuiszorg 2009, Tijd voor reguleringszekerheid, Utrecht, the 
Netherlands. 
 
Pope, D.G., 2009, Reacting to rankings: Evidence from “America’s Best Hospitals”, Journal of 
Health Economics, 28, 1154-1165. 
 
Propper, C., S. Burgess and K. Green, 2004, Does competition between hospitals improve the 
quality of care? Hospital death rates and the NHS internal market, Journal of Public Economics, 
88(7-8), 1247-1272. 
 
Sari, N., 2002, Do competition and managed care improve quality?, Health Economics, 11, 
571–584. 
 
Viscusi, W. K., 1978, A Note on "Lemons" Markets with Quality Certification, Bell Journal of 
Economics, 9, 277–279.  
   46 
Volpp K.G., S.V. Williams, J. Walsfogel, J.H. Silber, J.S. Schwartz and M.V. Pauly, 2003, 
Market reform in New Jersey and the effect on mortality from acute myocardial infarction, 
Health Services Research, 38(2), 515-533. 
 
Zaslavsky, A.M., 2001, Statistical issues in reporting quality data: small samples and case mix 
variation, International Journal for Quality in Health Care, 13 (6), 481-488.        